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Part Three: The Opening of Recruitment
Harold Perkin
The Pattern of Social Transformation in England
Between 1850 and 1930 there took place in England a revolution in higher education.
It was a revolution in the meaning, purpose, size and personnel, both staff and stu¬
dents, of the English universities, and it was arguably more profound than any
change since the 13th Century foundation of Oxford and Cambridge or before the
transition towards mass higher education ofthe 1960s. In round terms it was nothing
less than the transformation ofthe university from a marginal institution, an optional
finishing school for young gentlemen and prospective clergymen, into the central
power house of modern industrial society.
The measure of this revolution can be taken by asking what difference it would
have made to English society in 1850 and again in 1930 if the universities had sud-
denly disappeared. In 1850—almost none. The 850-strong Oxbridge intake, mostly
sons of landowners and clergy, could easily, like most of their class, have found alter¬
native ways of passing the time and, if they wished, of qualifying for the Church or
other liberal professions in foreign travel, military College, articled clerkships or the
theological seminaries. Neither Ordination for the Church, which took 38% of Cam¬
bridge graduates between 1800 and 1849, nor the professions of law, medicine, public
administration and teaching, which took 21%, required a university degree, nor was a
degree sufficient training for law or medicine. Hardly any Oxford or Cambridge
man, even of the handful (6% at Cambridge) who came from business families, went
into business.1 The only occupation which might have suffered, and that a largely un¬
paid one, was politics—and most peers and M.P.s did not have a degree.
The 375 or so full-time internal students at London University in 1861 and the 50
at Durham were scarcely more relevant to the needs of the new industrial society of
mid-Victorian England, apart perhaps from the majority who studied medicine and
1. Lawrence Stone, "The Size and Composition of the Oxford Student Body, 1580-1910" in
L. Stone, ed., The University in Society (2 vols., Princeton, 1974), 1:91-2, tables 1 A and 1 B(for
both Oxford and Cambridge admissions); Fritz K Ringer, Education and Society in Modern
Europe (Bloomington, 1979), 236 (for social origins and subsequent careers of Cambridge
students, abstracted from Hester Jenkins and D. Caradog Jones, "Social Class of Cambridge
Alumni ofthe 18th and 19th centuries," British Journal ofSociology, 1 [1950] and a 1938 sur¬
vey by the Cambridge University Appointments Board).
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the few scientists and engineers; and most doctors and engineers were still trained on
the job by a form of apprenticeship.2
The Broadening of Social Recruitment:
In the English as distinct from the Scottish universities, where in Glasgow as many as
a third of the students in the 1830s were working-class, there was scarcely a single
workman's son.3 At Oxford in 1835 there was one and in 1860 no "plebeian," a term
which embraced everyone below "gentleman" and the clergy,4 and there is no reason
to think that there were more poor students at Cambridge, London or Durham,
where the fees ensured that only the middle and upper class could afford them. Even
the middle class were mostly absent from Oxford and Cambridge. Nearly two-thirds
(63%) of Cambridge students between 1800 and 1849 came from landed and clergy
families, 21% from the liberal professions, and only 6% from business and banking.5
All the Oxford students in 1835 and 1860 were sons of landowners, clergy and "gen¬
tlemen," though the 21 percent to 32 percent of the latter must have included some
professional and business men.6 In no university in Britain were women of any class
admitted. In total the English universities admitted less than 0.3% of what is now
calied the Student age group, and if the Scottish universities admitted a larger share
ofa smaller population, most of these were between 15 and 18 years old and were not
university students in the modern sense at all.7
As for the academic staff, they were chiefly drawn, as Arthur Engel has shown for
Oxford, from the "gentlemanly" classes. Between 1813 and 1830, 45% of his sample
were sons of clergymen, 28% of squires, armigers and "gentlemen," 15% of business
and professional men, and only 5% from the "non-gentlemanly" classes. As late as
the years 1881 to 1900 over 80% still came from the gentlemanly classes.8 More to the
point, most of the dons at Oxford and Cambridge were "poor relations," young men
of good parentage but little inherited wealth, who became temporary celibate fellows
while they waited their tum for a College living in the Church which they needed be¬
cause their families lacked the patronage or wealth to provide one. Only 15% re¬
mained in the university for life, either because they gained a professorship or head-
ship of a College which allowed them to marry or because a Church living never came
their way. The professors at London and Durham, almost all recruited from Oxford
and Cambridge, only differed from most dons in that they had gained a life appoint¬
ment with freedom to marry similar to the Oxbridge professors and heads of houses.
2. Figures from R A. Lowe, Table 1, in his contribution to this volume; for the preponderance
of medical students at London University and other civic Colleges see W. H. G. Armytage,
Civic Universities (London, 1955), 170-75.
3. Michael Sanderson, The Universities and British Industry, 1850-1970 (London, 1972), 148.
4. Stone, 93.
5. Ringer, 236.
6. Stone, loc. cit.; Ringer, 239.
7. Sanderson, 149; Harold Perkin, Key Profession: The History of the Association of University
Teachers (London, 1969), 6.
8. Arthur J. Engel, "From Clergyman to Don: The Rise ofthe Academic Profession in 19th-
century Oxford" (Diss., Princeton University, 1975) Appendix 2.
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Only these few career academics would have permanently missed the universities of
1850.
Nor could the English universities claim to be vital to intellectual culture or scien¬
tific research. Not one ofthe intellectual giants ofthe early 19th Century (Bentham,
Coleridge, Malthus, Ricardo, Davy, Faraday or Darwin) was a university don, and
the few academic scientists like Wheatstone, Daniell and Lyell were only to be found
at the new University of London. The Royal Commission of 1852 on Oxford feared
that "the clergy and gentry who are educated at the university" would in their igno-
rance of physical science be left behind by their social inferiors, to the serious injury
of both science and other branches of knowledge.9
Lest it should be thought that Scotiand was more advanced—as it certainly had
been in the 18th Century with the European leadership of Adam Fergusson, Dugald
Stewart, Adam Smith, John Miliar and the Scottish historical school of philosophy—
one Scottish historian has talked of "the intellectual paralysis of intellectual life asso¬
ciated with Victorian Scotiand." If that is exaggerated, the undergraduate faculties of
Scottish universities were really secondary schools for 12- to 17-year-olds—"misera¬
ble filthy little urchins" as Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine calied those of Glasgow
in 1823.10 Their output, chiefly of kirk ministers and village dominies, was no more
relevant to modern industrial society than that of Oxbridge.
In sum, the universities of Britain in 1850 could have been abolished with no great
loss to the British economy and society. They were, indeed, less important than in the
early 17th Century, when on the eve ofthe Civil War they had educated 1.1% ofthe
age group, over three times the percentage of 1850.11
By contrast, what if the universities had disappeared in 1930? That would have in-
flicted an immense loss on society and industry. By that date there were, including
the five Scottish ones, 22 universities and university Colleges in receipt of Treasury
grants (24 if we inciude the unfunded Colleges at Hüll and Leicester) and 58 institu¬
tions if we count the separately funded Colleges and schools of London and the Uni¬
versity of Wales. They catered to about 50,000 students, representing 1.7% ofthe age
group, or at least six times the percentage of 1850.12 More important, it was a more
critical percentage, a tme elite which would supply most of the top positions in the
Cabinet, the civil service, the medical and legal professions, and made a substantial
contribution to the owners and managers of banking and big business.
As for the social origins of the students, the universities now catered, if unequally,
to the whole social ränge. Nearly a quarter (23%)—more than a quarter of the men
(27%)—were children of manual workers, a larger percentage than in any other West
9. Report ofthe Royal Commission on the University of Oxford (1852), 79-80.
10. "Vindiciae Gallicae," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 13 (1823), 94: the undergraduate
Faculty of Arts was "a school where boys from twelve years of age to sixteen or seventeen"
were instructed in elementary Classics, Mathematics, Logic, Ethics, etc., and were not to be
compared with those of Eton, Westminster, Winchester, or Harrow (English grammar board¬
ing schools).
11. Stone, 103.
12. University Grants Committee, Report for the Period 1929-30 to 1934-35 (London, H. M. S.
O., 1936), 11; Robbins Committee, Report on Higher Education (London, H. M. S. O., 1963),
16.
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European country.'3 Although the child of a professional or managerial father had
over 30 times the chance of getting to university of that of an unskilled worker, what
has more often been overlooked is that only about one-third of upper class off-spring
got there, which meant that two-thirds were beaten in the climb up the educational
ladder by children from below.14 Women, too, now found a place there, with 23% of
the Student body, though fewer of them (13%) came from the working class.15 (To
complete the picture we should add the large non-university sector of higher educa¬
tion, mainly teacher training and technical Colleges, which contained another one
percent of the age group and far more women and working-class students.)
The university teachers, too, had changed out of all recognition. No longer mainly
clergymen waiting for permanent employment, they had become secular professional
academics with a recognizably structured lifetime career. There is little information
on their social background until after the Second World War. Ofthose in a 1968 sam¬
ple who had entered university service before 1945 most, 83.2%, came from the pro¬
fessional and managerial classes and only 5.3% from the working class; but what is
perhaps more significant is that the largest group, 42.5%, came from lesser manage¬
rial and professional families and, if we add the non-manual workers, half (49.6%)
came from the lower middle class, and more than half (54.9%) from below the top so¬
cial class.16 Allowing in the latter for professional and salaried fathers with very little
capital, there can be little doubt that the vast majority of academics were middle-
class men (only about 10% were women, as now) with little family wealth and wholly
dependent on their university salaries. As the best examinees of their peer group,
they reflected belatedly the changed composition of the Student body, but with a bias
towards the scholarship boy from the grammar and direct grant schools, from which
came no less than 72.3 percent. Although the largest single group, 43.4%, were grad¬
uates of Oxbridge, where nearly half came from the public boarding schools, only
22.3% ofthe university teachers were boarding-school produets—a much smaller per¬
centage than in most elites in Britain at that time.17 University teaching had become a
meritoeratie profession mainly for the bright but poorer sons of the middle class.
The Rising Importance of Higher Learning:
Meanwhile the whole meaning and purpose of the university as an institution had
changed. Apart from educating a large fraction of the elite in most occupations and
acting as a narrow but effective Channel of social mobility especially from the lower
middle ranges of society, the university had come to play a much more central role in
the economy and indeed in matters of life and death. Michael Sanderson has chroni-
cled the increasing involvement of the universities from the late 19th Century on-
13. The figures are for those of university admission age (18) in 1928-47 and are taken from
Jean Floud "The Educational Experience of the Adult Population of England and Wales as
at July 1949" in D. V. Glass, ed., Social Mobility in Britain (London, 1954), cited by A. H.
Halsey, Trends in British Society Since 1900 (London, 1972), 189, 219.
14. Figures from Jean Floud, cited by Ringer, 243.
15. Halsey, 217 and 219.
16. Perkin, 262.
17. Perkin, 259, 260.
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wards in industry, beginning with shipbuilding, chemicals and electrical engineering
and continuing with man-made fibers and plastics, pharmaceuticals, dyestuffs and
electronics, a development to which we shall return.18 Beyond that, university science
had begun to explore the keys to life in cellular biology, bacteriology, virology, ge-
netics, and to death as well as life in atomic research. One has only to recall a few of
the names—Rutherford in nuclear physics, Fleming in antibiotics, Blackett in opera¬
tional research—to realize how blindingly relevant the universities had become to the
survival of man on this planet.
On a humbler level, the universities had begun to take over from apprenticeship
and the professional institutions the advanced education of most of the higher pro¬
fessions. As the Vice-Chancellor of London University put it, belatedly in 1946, "The
tmth is that all the professions are pressing us, as universities, to take on the greater
part, if not the whole, ofthe requisite professional or technical training for their own
professional subjects." He went on to mention accountancy, veterinary medicine, es¬
tate management, youth leadership and journalism19—marginal professions com¬
pared with those which had already been absorbed. The U.G.C. annual listings from
1925-26 of "branches of study in which advanced students were engaged" chronicle
this trend: 7 kinds of engineering, 10 of agricultural science, at least 12 industrial
technologies from aeronautics and brewing to oil and textiles, 28 specialisms in med¬
icine, and a new and burgeoning ränge of economic and social sciences.20 We must
not exaggerate the extent to which the universities were the progenitors of a more
qualified, professional society, but academics were already on the way to becoming
the key profession, the profession which provides both the expertise and the experts
for most ofthe other professions.21 If the universities had disappeared in 1930, they
would have left a gaping hole in the social and industrial fabric—and Hitler would
have won the Second World War.
It would be interesting to trace the stages by which this extraordinary change be¬
tween 1850 and 1930 in the meaning, purpose, size and personnel of universities
came about. The story would begin with the seething discontent ofthe new industrial
classes at the exclusiveness and complacency of Oxford and Cambridge, which had
come to monopolize for the Anglican clergy and gentry a national resource originally
founded for poor scholars. It would follow the movement for reform both outside
Oxbridge, in the effort to found alternative institutions for middle-class sons in Lon¬
don and the great industrial cities, and inside, with the help of parliamentary pres¬
sure Coming to the aid of clerical dons seeking a lifelong career compatible with mar¬
riage and an opportunity to study and teach more relevant subjects like history, mod¬
ern languages, the physical sciences and economics. It would bring in their increas¬
ing involvement in industry, with massive donations from industrialists on one side
and on the other the penetration of academic inventors and Consultants into the
process of technological advance. It would show the increasing financial support of
18. Sanderson, passim.
19. Home Universities Conference, 1946: Report of Proceedings (Association of Commonwealth
Universities, London, 1946).
20. University Grants Committee, Returnsfrom Universities and University Colleges ... (annually
from 1925-26 onwards) (London, H. M. S. O., 1926).
21. Cf. Perkin, Key Profession, Chap. 1.
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the state from the first minute grant of £ 15,000 to university Colleges in 1889,
through the establishment of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in
1917 and ofthe U.G.C. in 1919, to the shouldering by the 1930s of about one-third of
university expenditure and the consequent "remote control" of academic remunera¬
tion. Above all, it would trace the constmction of an educational ladder, from the
higher grade elementary schools of the 1880s and the state-supported secondary
schools of 1902 through the grammar school scholarship of 1907 to the state and
L.E.A. university studentships from 1920 onwards.22
This story has, however, been more than adequately chronicled by Armytage, San¬
derson, Sheldon Rothblatt, Arthur Engel and others.23 In the space available it is
more important to ask why this revolution took place at all, and why in so short a
time, in what was by any Standards the most aristocratic, conservative and class-rid-
den of modern industrial societies. It is not enough to point, with A. H. Halsey, to
"the remarkable absorptive capacity, the judicious and un-Marxist Fabianism of the
upper classes."24 The upper classes were not Fabian except perhaps in the original
Roman sense of knowing when to retreat to still stronger positions, and attitudes are
not causes but effects which themselves need explanation. Just as the most important
reason for the first Industrial Revolution can be found not in the progressive atti¬
tudes of English landlords but in the material self-interest underlying those atti¬
tudes—they stood to gain in increased rent from the enclosures, mines, canals, rail¬
ways and new towns25—so their part in the early stages of the university revolution
can best be explained by self-interest, including their interest in political survival and
the art of compromise to avoid something worse.
But first we must rid ourselves of the unhistorical and intellectualist fallacy that
the universities before the great transformation were as important to the mling
classes as they have since become to intellectuals. It is salutary to be reminded how
contemptuous the old landed class could be of academic pursuits. As a Student one
of my friends, now a senior Oxford don, was found reading by his fox-hunting aunt,
a female squire. "What!" she said, "Are you still reading a book? Most unhealthy!
Why don't you get out and ride a horse?" There were aristocratic politicians in 1850
who were scholars, like the Earl of Derby who preferred translating Homer to being
22. Cf. A. H. Halsey, A. F. Heath and J. M. Ridge, Origins and Destinations: Family, Class and
Education in Modern Britain (Oxford, 1980), 25: the proportion of scholarships or "free
places" in grammar schools rose from a required 25% under the 1907 regulations to an ac¬
tual 45% in 1931 (drawn mainly from the less affluent middle class and the upper working
class). See also R H. Tawney, Secondary Educationfor All (London, 1922), 20: "The number
both of pupils and school places in 1922 is ... all too small. But, inadequate as they are, they
represent something like an educational revolution compared with the almost complete ab¬
sence of public provision which existed prior to 1902" (quoted ibid.). A more detailed ac¬
count may be found in G. A. N. Lowndes, The Silent Social Revolution (2nd ed., Oxford,
1969).
23. Armytage, op. cit., Sanderson, op. cit., Sheldon Rothblatt, The Revolution ofthe Dons: Cam¬
bridge and Society in Victorian England (London, 1968), Engel, op. cit.
24. A. H. Halsey, "British Universities and Intellectual Life" in A. H. Halsey, J. T. Floud and
C. A. Anderson, eds., Education, Economy and Society (London, 1961), 506.
25. Cf. Harold Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880 (London, 1969), esp.
chap. 3.
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Pnme Minister, or Peel and Gladstone who both took double firsts at Oxford But
the great majonty thought brain work only marginally supenor to manual work and,
when necessary to their well-being, preferably done by other people for the pitiful
wages it was worth Education was mainly valued for the group unity and social su-
penonty it brought, including the ability to understand the Latin tags in parhamen¬
tary speeches, but this was more a product ofthe great public schools than ofthe an¬
cient universities, which were "optional extras
"
As for the modern universities, they
were objects of chanty for the lower orders, much hke the village church schools on a
larger scale, important for political support and social control, but on no account to
be attended by one's own children
The defence of the pnvileges of Oxford and Cambndge was really the defence of
the Church of England monopoly, which by 1851, when it was discovered that only a
minonty of the population attended the established Church,26 had beome mdefensi-
ble Even Gladstone, M P for the University and a high Anglican and loyal alum-
nus, was not prepared to defend it and introduced the bill to reform Oxford him¬
self
27
It was, hke the 1832 Reform Act or the Repeal ofthe Com Laws, a concession
which gave nothing vital away The dissenters would be pleased and, as long as Latin
and Greek were prerequisites for admission, the sons of the clergy and gentry and
those professions which chose to be "civihzed" in the public schools would still have
the edge over all competitors Moreover, once Oxford and Cambndge were reformed
it became possible to justify new forms of privilege, such as their near-monopoly of
the competitive examinations for the civil service from 1870 Reform was a retreat to
a stronger position
In the same way the new civic universities could be tolerated and even encouraged
with royal charters and, eventuaUy, government funds because they infringed upon
no aristocratic interest, they drew middle-class pohtical support, and they were, in
their view, only a higher form of that "technical Instruction" which the govemment
already supported via the Science and Art Department from the 1850s and the "whis
key money" after 1889
28
It was also in the national interest and in the interests of in¬
creased urban rents if the country was prosperous in the face of international compe¬
tition It would be a mistake, however, to attach too much importance to the fear of
foreign competition engendered by the international exhibitions of 1851, 1867, and
1878
29
This may have been a factor in State support for evening classes and technical
Colleges but at the university level it assumes at too early a stage a strong and direct
connection with industnal employment which was simply not there Only seven per¬
cent of Cambndge graduates in 1850-99 went into business, including banking, and
though the figures for London or the civic and Scottish universities are patchy, the
percentages there around the turn of the Century were not much greater
30
The great
majonty of graduates both from Oxbndge and from the provincial universities down
to the First World War went into the professions, including the clergy (dissenting as
26 Census of England and Wales 1851 Rehgious Worship (London, H M S 0,1854)
27 John Morley, Life of Gladstone (London, 1908), 1 369 79
28 O M V Argles, From South Kensington to Robbins An Account of English Technical and
Scientific Education since 1851 (London, 1964), chap 2
29 Cf Argles, Armytage, 219-22
30 Ringer, 236, Sanderson, 100-101, 111 14, 173-79
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well as Anglican), public administration, law, medicine and teaching. Even the scien¬
tists and engineers tended to prefer public employment, teaching or private profes¬
sional practice to industry.31 Industrialism was certainly the main driving force be¬
hind higher education, as it was behind the expansion of the professions, but it was
industrialism in the broadest sense of the growth of a new urban class society de¬
manding more and better professional and administrative Services, not in the nar¬
rower sense of the employment needs of industry itself. These could still best be met,
it was generally agreed, by training on the job supplemented by mainly part-time
technical Instruction below the university level. With a few significant exceptions in
particular science and engineering departments where the seeds of the future were
being sown,32 the new and reformed universities down to the early years of the 20th
Century were chiefly schools preparatory to the literate and liberal professions and
instruments for turning the sons of the other classes, whether landowners, business
men or the few, notably in Wales and Scotiand, from the working class, into profes¬
sional men.
The Causes ofthe Social Transformation:
We are thus left with a paradox. If the reforms and new foundations of the Victorian
age had only succeeded in changing the universities from finishing schools for young
gentlemen and prospective clergymen into preparatory schools for the professions,
how then did they manage to become by 1930 so vital to modern industry and socie¬
ty? Mainly because of changes outside the universities which transformed the struc¬
ture of demand for their produets, both for knowledge and for graduates. These
changes, which began in the late 19th Century and came to füll fmition in the inter¬
war period, can be summed up as follows:
1) the rise of big business and with it of a plutoeratie class by an amalgamation of
the new millionaires with the old great landowners;
2) the relative decline of the landed gentry (the mral squires) and of the clergy whose
incomes were heavily dependent on falling agricultural prices;
3) the emergence of new science-based industries closely linked to university re¬
search and graduate employment;
4) the growth of State administration and its more direct involvement in the economy
and social life;
5) the narrowing, by taxation and educational policies as well as by big business and
big govemment, of the Channels of social recruitment and their concentration in
the system of education and qualification.
The rise of big business between the 1880s and the 1920s is well-known in its eco¬
nomic aspects, but its social effects have been little studied. The number of joint-
stock companies rose from 11,000 in 1888 to about 65,000 in 1914,33 but more to the
point was the rise of giant enterprises like Lever Brothers, Courtaulds, J. and P.
31. Sanderson, loc. cit.
32. Sanderson, esp. 83-93, 107-11, 160-65.
33. Sir John H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge, 1926), 3:202,
222.
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Coats and Brunner-Mond, predecessor of I. C. I. The social effects of this develop¬
ment, coupled with those ofthe so-called "Great Depression" of 1874-96 on agricul¬
tural prices and rents, were profound. The wealth and status of the majority of the
landed class were undermined, but the richer landlords, like the great London dukes
with urban property, mines and other resources were joined in a new plutoeratie,
London-based class by great capitalists, many of them self-made millionaires like
Lord Leverhulme, Lord Northcliffe, Cecil Rhodes and Sir Thomas Lipton.34 The ar¬
istocracy mshed to diversify their holdings and incomes, on the one side to join the
boards ofjoint-stock companies—one-quarter ofthe peerage became Company direc¬
tors by 1896—and on the other side to join the "flight from the land" which, after the
1909 "People's Budget" with its supertax and threatened land taxes, began the big-
gest transfer of land since the Conquest.35 The plutoerats were few, however, and for
most of the upper class a leisured life on the land was no longer an automatic right.
Their children would have to fend for themselves and compete, admittedly with com¬
petitive advantages, with others for the top jobs in society.
The decline in agricultural rents and prices, to which the clergy's incomes were
tied, removed overnight the attraction of the main alternative career for younger sons
and for the sons of the clergy themselves. At the same time the secular professionali¬
zation of college fellowships removed another reason for Ordination.36 The propor¬
tion of Cambridge graduates going into the Church plummeted from 38% between
1850 and 1899 to six percent in the 1930s. The two largest classes which still between
1850 and 1899 supplied 50% of Cambridge graduates clearly had to find other jobs to
do, often without higher education, and their numbers feil to nine percent by the
1930s. Their places were taken partly by children of the professional class, who in¬
creased from 26% to 30% of a much larger Student body, but much more by those of
the business class, who increased from 15 percent to 46 percent.
Still more striking was the change in social destinations. The share of those going
into the Church and landowning as a career shrank from 45 percent to six percent
(0% in land) and they were replaced partly by an increase in professional employ¬
ment from 39% to 49%, still more by an increase of those going into business from
seven percent to 31 percent.37 Sanderson's figures show larger percentages of Cam¬
bridge graduates going into industry and business between the Wars, rising to 52% in
1929 and averaging 40% for the whole period.38 Oxford, allowing for its larger
weighting of arts degrees, had a similarly dramatic increase in business careers, from
seven percent between 1906 and 1910 to 31% in 1938, and averaging 24% in the 1920s
and 1930s.39 Curiously enough, apart from Birmingham, Liverpool and Newcastle,
which averaged 32%, 52% and 64% in the early 1920s, most provincial universities
had smaller proportions going into business than Oxford and particularly Cam-
34. Cf. F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the 19th Century (London, 1963), chap.
11; and Harold Perkin, "Land Reform and Class Conflict in Victorian Britain" in John Butt
and P. F. Clarke, The Victorians and Social Protest (Newton Abbot, 1973).
35. Thompson, 306-07, 321-26.
36. Cf. Engel, 467.
37. Ringer, 236.
38. Sanderson, 279.
39. Sanderson, 279.
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bridge.40 This underlines the fact that the upper and upper middle classes who still
dominated Oxbridge were much quicker to seize the new opportunities in business,
and were more welcome as recruits with "the right social background" than provin¬
cial graduates. Such indeed was the aim of the Appointments Boards set up in Ox¬
ford and Cambridge in the 1890s with the help of business men like Sir Douglas Fox,
Lord Rothschild and Nathaniel Cohen with the express purpose of recruiting grad¬
uates for big business.41 Even an Oxbridge arts graduate, it was assumed, was a better
prospect for management than a provincial scientist or engineer, and it is noticeable
that the graduates from other universities were nearly all scientists and engineers,
mainly recruited for research and production and only rarely for management train¬
ing.
Graduate scientists and engineers, however, were certainly needed for the new
science-based industries of the 20th Century. Many of these, such as steam turbines,
electrical engineering, electronics and broadcasting, dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, man-
made fibers and petrochemicals, were based on fundamental research done mainly in
19th Century universities, often with active collaboration between industrialists and
professors like Sir Henry Roscoe, Lord Kelvin, MacQuorn Rankine and J. J. Thom¬
son. Such science professors acted not only as Consultants but as recmiting agents
between their students and business, and their departments became the seedbeds of
whole new industries.42 By the inter-war period the universities had become vital to
the development and survival of the most advanced and rapidly growing sectors of
British industry.
The growth of big govemment which began in the late 19th Century also provided
opportunities for graduate employment and academic consultancy. The number of
civil servants which had scarcely kept pace with population for most ofthe 19th Cen¬
tury leapt from 50,859 in 1881 to 116,413 in 1901, to 317,721 in 1922 (during the post-
War decline) and to 350,293 in 1936.43 The increase was due to the growth in govern¬
ment responsibility for an ever-widening ränge of Services, including education, pub¬
lic health, factory inspection, industrial arbitration and conciliation, as well as the
rising scale of military Operations, and above all to the incipient rise of the welfare
state, which took central govemment offices for the first time (except for the Customs
and Excise) into every provincial town and placed new burdens on the local authori¬
ties as well. By no means all the new civil servants and local government officials
were graduates but those in the higher echelons were, and the highest grade of the
civil service was almost exclusively recruited from Oxford and Cambridge.44 At
lower levels, such as factory inspection and social work, other graduates could find a
foothold. The London School of Economics, for example, set up the first course in
welfare work.45 The universities, and especially Cambridge and London began in-
40. Sanderson, 279.
41. Sanderson, 55-58.
42. Sanderson, 100-101, 111-14, 173-79.
43. H. Finer, The British Civil Service (London, 1937), 24.
44. Cf. R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain from 1870 to the Present Day (London,
1955).
45. Lord Beveridge, The London School ofEconomics and its Problems, 1919-37 (London, 1960),
86.
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creasingly to fumish the government with Consultants on social and economic prob¬
lems hke J M Keynes, R H Tawney and W H Beveridge, though it did not always
accept their advice
^
Here again the universities found themselves at the heart of one
of the most far-reaching developments of modern society, the expanding corporate
state
The combined effect of all these four developments was to converge on the fifth,
the channelhng of recruitment to most of the ehtes in society through education and
the qualification Systems, at the apex of which now stood the universities Given the
closing of other avenues, into leisured landownership or the Church, even the chil¬
dren ofthe upper class were forced to seek higher education if they wished to be cer¬
tain to reach the top With the nse of big business and the Operation of super-tax and
death duties it became more difficult (though not impossible) for middle-class and
the few working-class entrepreneurs to build up a business and make a fortune,47 and
so hopes of social mobihty were channelled towards education The educational lad¬
der itself diverted middle and working-class talent away from traditional forms of so¬
cial chmbing, and many a potential self-made man became a professor or a civil ser¬
vant instead The ladder brought talent from below into competition with the chil¬
dren of the higher classes By a quirk of the English system it was easier for a really
bnght but poor child to go to Oxford or Cambridge than to a provincial university
since, after the reforms of the 1870s, there were far more open scholarships there to
be won Although the scholars were few, they had by definition to be good at compe¬
titive examinations, and they tended to get better degrees and a larger share of uni¬
versity fellowships and civil service places, which accounts for the rapid shift in those
professions towards recruitment from the lower middle ranges of society
48
Thus the
competition was immediately feit by the sons of the higher classes, who had to stnve
harder in the educational competition or shift their attention to careers where social
background and "character" gave them an advantage, in business and the socially
supenor and more expensive professions such as law and medicine
The net result of this convergence of recruitment upon the educational route was
what may be calied a "threshold effect
"
With dramatic suddenness, between the first
and third decades ofthe 20th Century the percentage ofthe age group enrolled in uni¬
versities doubled, from 0 8 percent to 1 5 percent Higher education became fashion-
able, almost a necessity, even for the rieh who wished to reach the top of the great
functional elites and even for those who came from the business class and/or hoped
to get into management They avoided the provincial universities, but both Oxbridge
and the rest became more vital to the middle classes, both for those who followed the
now traditional routes into the professions and the more adventurous who were will
46 Keynes was an economic adviser to the British delegation to the Versailles Treaty confer
ence, 1919, Tawney the leading member ofthe Hadow Committee on secondary education,
1926, and Bevendge's contnbutions ränge from assistance to Churchill over labor ex
changes, 1909, to his famous report on Social Insurance and Alhed Services 1942
47 For the changing social origins of large Company chairmen and millionaires see H J Per
kin, Ehtes in British Society since 1880 (unpublished report to S S R C , 1976, deposited in
British Library Lending Division)
48 Perkin, above, and "The Recruitment of Ehtes in British Society since 1880 , Journal ofSo
etal History Winter 1978
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ing to take their chances in business. For bright boys and (fewer) girls from the work¬
ing class all their hopes of social mobility came to center on the grammar school and
university, preferably Oxbridge. For all classes the university became the normal
route to high status and income. This was an aspect of the rise of professionalism as
the guiding principle of modern society.
Thus the revolution in British higher education, though from one point of view oc-
cupying the whole period between 1850 and 1930 and by no means complete even
then, from another passed its critical turning point almost ovemight, between, say,
1900 and 1920. The war, though not itself the cause, accelerated the transition, by ex¬
tending the role of the State, challenging the automatic leadership of the traditional
ruling class, bringing forward new leaders from the ranks, and shaking up old as¬
sumptions about what men—and women—from different social backgrounds could
do and not do. But the causes lay much deeper, in the profound shifts in income, so¬
cial stmcture and expectations about the distribution of life chances which began in
the late 19th Century. At the risk of massive oversimplification of complex develop¬
ments, the revolution may be summed up in a sentence. Before, 1900, despite many
undercurrents of change, the universities are still in the world of leisured gentlemen
and the gentlemanly professions; after 1920, despite many hangovers from the past,
they are in the bustling, strenuous world of business and the competitive professions,
where serious preparation for high status and incomes is channelled increasingly
through higher education. By the 1920s the university is no Ionger a finishing school
for young gentlemen; it is the central power house of modern industry and society.
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